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ABSTRACT
An Android app must be authorized for permissions, dened
by the Android platform, in order to access certain capabili-
ties of an Android device. An app developer species which
permissions an app will require and these permissions must
be authorized by the user of the device when the app is in-
stalled. Permissions, and the tools that are used to manage
them, form the basis of the Android permission architec-
ture, which is an essential part of the access control services
provided by the Android platform.
We have analyzed the evolution of the Android permis-
sion architecture across six versions of the Android platform,
identifying various changes which have occurred during that
period and a considerable amount of information about the
permission architecture which is not included in the Android
documentation. Using this information, we have identied
a weakness in the way that the Android platform handles
app permissions during platform upgrades. We explain how
this weakness may be exploited by a developer to produce
malicious software which the average user is unlikely to de-
tect. We conclude with a discussion of potential mitigation
techniques for this weakness, highlighting concerns drawn
from other research in this area.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
D.4.6 [Operating Systems]: Security and Protection;
D.2.7 [Software Engineering]: Distribution, Maintenance
and Enhancement
General Terms
Security
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Android; permissions; permission architecture; authoriza-
tion; privacy; malware
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1. INTRODUCTION
Mobile operating systems such as the Android platform
employ various security mechanisms in order to manage op-
eration of the mobile device. The mechanisms are employed
to balance the interaction of the user, their device, the in-
stalled apps and the associated data. There are three prin-
cipal security mechanisms employed by the Android plat-
form with varying levels of rigour and eectiveness: appli-
cation sandboxing, application permissions and installation
controls.
Application sandboxing limits the resources with which an
app can interact, and in so doing it prevents malicious apps
from aecting the behaviour and data of other apps and the
underlying Android platform. Application permissions pro-
vide a mechanism through which an app may be authorized
to make use of particular capabilities of the Android plat-
form or of other apps. Informally, application sandboxing is
a straight-jacket and the permissions are the bindings which
keep it tight or allow it to be loosened. Finally, installation
controls are present to restrict the mechanism through which
apps are installed. The Android platform can be congured
to only allow apps to be installed from the ocial Google
Play app store, or alternatively can allow third-party sources
to be used. When restricted to the ocial app store only,
these controls, along with the Google Play policies, help
provide some measure of condence in the provenance of an
app. When third-party sources are enabled this measure of
condence is removed and it is the user's sole responsibility
to determine the trustworthiness of any app they choose to
install.
This paper focuses on the application permissions archi-
tecture. There has previously been signicant research into
the Android permission architecture, with a wide variety of
approaches so far undertaken. We consider some of this re-
lated work in Section 6. Our contribution to this research is
taken from two distinct viewpoints.
Firstly, we investigated the categorisations employed
within the permissions architecture. Permissions are or-
ganised both in functional groupings, within which similar
permissions are collated, and in terms of protection levels,
which dictate the requirements which must be met for a
permission to be granted. By setting such requirements,
protection levels indicate a degree of sensitivity for the per-
missions categorised under them. Functional groupings are
equally designed so as to provide the user information about
the permissions, with the hope of aiding the authorization
decisions a user must make when installing apps.
Secondly, we investigated how these categorisations have
changed over time, as new versions of the Android plat-
form have been introduced. This view of the history and
development of the Android platform is of particular inter-
est when attempting to identify the rationale for the current
permission architecture conguration. Android versions are
associated with an API level and a codename. Table 1 sum-
marizes Android versions since January 2010; bold entries
indicate API levels used in our research. Henceforth, we will
refer to Android versions by API level.
Version Codename API Level
2.1 Eclair 7
2.2.x Froyo 8
2.3{2.3.2
Gingerbread
9
2.3.3{2.3.7 10
3.0
Honeycomb
11
3.1 12
3.2.x 13
4.0.1{4.0.2
Ice Cream Sandwich
14
4.0.3{4.0.4 15
4.1.x
Jelly Bean
16
4.2.x 17
4.3 18
Table 1: Android versions, codenames and API levels
Thirdly, and most signicantly, we used the results of
these investigations to identify a hypothetical weakness in
the Android permission architecture. Informally, the weak-
ness arises because permissions are able to lie dormant and
only awake following an update to the Android platform, ei-
ther because a new app is installed or because Android itself
is upgraded. A dormant permission is one that is undened
when an app (that requests the permission) is installed. Un-
dened permissions are ignored at installation time. The
permission may become active if it is subsequently dened,
either as a third-party permission in another app that is
installed by the user or as a built-in permission in a later
version of Android. The user is normally required to autho-
rize an app to use permissions during the installation of an
app. However, the activation of a dormant permission occurs
without any notication to the user or any authorization by
the user.
Further experiment proved this weakness to be present
and easy to exploit. We document it here so as to raise
awareness of the potential for malicious exploit of the per-
missions architecture and to prime the discussion of poten-
tial mitigation strategies.
In Sections 2 and 3 we describe our two permission archi-
tecture investigations and their results. Then in Section 4
we discuss third-party permission granting and its relevance
to the results of our investigation . In Section 5 we describe
the threat identied by these investigations, its exploitation,
the repercussions and potential mitigation. We discuss re-
lated work in Section 6 and provide concluding remarks in
Section 7.
2. PERMISSION ARCHITECTURE
An Android app typically needs to interact with the de-
vice on which it is installed. The Android platform enables
such interactions by associating permissions with an app.
When a user installs an app on their Android device they
may be prompted to authorize certain permissions which
it requests: \Each application must declare upfront what
permissions it requires" [20]. The developer documents the
required permissions in the app's AndroidManifest.xml le
and the Android platform analyzes this list, displaying its
contents to the user, during installation.
Each permission is classied under one of a variety of pro-
tection levels. For example, those permissions which control
access to the lowest risk capabilities are considered nor-
mal whilst those of higher risk are considered dangerous.
During installation, those permissions which are rated dan-
gerous will be displayed to the user for their authorization
whilst those rated normal will be presented in a collapsed
list which must rst be expanded before the individual per-
mission requests can be seen. The authorization process is
atomic such that\users may only grant all requested permis-
sions or deny them all by not installing the application" [10].
Once installed, the permissions for which an app is autho-
rized can be reviewed via the app's `app info' screen, as seen
for one of our test apps in Figure 2. Granted permissions are
listed in two sections, dangerous followed by normal, with
the normal section collapsed by default. Functional group-
ings are present within these two sections bringing together
permissions which control access to similar features.
There are a signicant number of permissions built into
the Android platform which control access to various ca-
pabilities of the device. For example, location-based ser-
vices are controlled by ACCESS_COARSE_LOCATION and AC-
CESS_FINE_LOCATION whilst use of the device's internet con-
nection is controlled by INTERNET. Android also allows de-
velopers to dene their own (\third-party" dened) permis-
sions. Such permissions are not concerned with any un-
derlying Android system capabilities but are instead used
to control inter-app communication mechanisms such as In-
tents [8]. Developers dening third-party permissions can
dictate the protection level associated with that permission.
Moreover, there are several other protection levels available
in addition to the normal and dangerous protection levels
already mentioned: signature requires the requesting app
to be signed with the same key as the app which dened
that permission; whilst signatureOrSystem extends signa-
ture by allowing requesting apps to be part of the system
image.
There are many scenarios when the signature protection
level is likely to be most appropriate for third-party per-
missions. When used to protect inter-app communication,
permissions with this protection level will limit that commu-
nication to only those apps signed with the same key. That
said, there are equally legitimate scenarios which would re-
quire other protection level settings and the developer is able
to dene the setting necessary for their particular circum-
stances, functional requirements and risks.
As well as a protection level, every permission has asso-
ciated with it a label and a functional grouping. The la-
bel provides a short user-oriented denition, such as `ap-
proximate (network-based) location' for the permission AC-
CESS_COARSE_LOCATION, whilst the grouping is used to col-
late similar permissions together. So, for example, all those
permissions associated with a user's location information are
grouped under the heading `Your location'. The protection
level, label and functional grouping make up the core at-
Figure 1: Permission Test AndroidManifest.xml (lines 1 to
58)
tributes of the permission and form the basis upon which a
user is expected to make their authorization decisions when
installing an app.
2.1 Initial Investigation
The Android documentation web site currently lists 130
platform permissions [5]; this list being used as the starting
point of our investigation. We created a test app, called Per-
mission Test, which included each of these 130 permissions
in its manifest (see Figure 1), although the app's sole func-
tion was to display a `Hello World' message on the device's
screen. As the manifest permission requests are known to
trigger the authorization process even without an associated
need within the app's code base [20, 10, 11], this simplica-
tion avoided the complex, time-consuming and potentially
error-prone process of developing an app that exercised each
of the capabilities associated with those permissions.
The Permission Test app was installed on a stock Galaxy
Nexus device running API15 and which of the requested
list of 130 manifest permissions was granted was determined
by review of the app info screen seen in Figure 2.Where
necessary we also made use of internal Android system les,
in particular the data/system/packages.xml, the Android
logging system, and the testing of individual permissions.
Access to the data/system/packages.xml is not possible
on a stock device without elevated privileges. In order to
achieve the desired access without impacting the investiga-
tion's results we manually `rooted' the device, when neces-
sary, using minimal, reversible steps and without modifying
the operating system image. In this way we were able to
extract the data required whilst ensuring accurate and re-
peatable results.
2.2 Initial Investigation Findings
Our results, as broken down in Table 2, show that 79 of the
130 manifest permissions were granted to Permission Test.
Log entries tagged `PackageManager' helped us identify the
fate of the other 51 permissions.
The Package Manager is the Android service responsible
for installation and app management. Three warning types
were seen and are documented below.
 4 instances of `Unknown permission [...] in package
com.[...].permission.test'
 24 instances of `Not granting permission [...] to
package com.[...].permission.test (protectionLevel=2
ags=0x8be46)'
 23 instances of `Not granting permission [...] to
package com.[...].permission.test (protectionLevel=3
ags=0x8be46)'
A comparison with the Android documentation [5, 7] re-
vealed that the four manifest permissions associated with
the `Unknown permission' warning were introduced in
API16 and so were `unknown' to the version of the Android
platform running on the device (API15). The documenta-
tion also conrmed that `protectionLevel=2' indicates the
signature protection level whilst `protectionLevel=3' indi-
cates the signatureOrSystem protection level. Therefore,
whilst the log le did not contain detailed information about
labels or groupings, it did provide protection level informa-
tion for 47 of the 51 manifest permissions which hadn't been
granted. The classication of these 47 permissions also con-
rmed why they had not been granted to Permission Test :
the app was not signed by the necessary key nor was it part
of the system and so failed to meet the criteria necessary to
have them granted.
Installing Permission Test on the Android emulator run-
ning API16 resulted in the test app being granted three of
the four unknown permissions, two of which were classied
as dangerous and the other was classied as normal. The
one remaining permission was not granted, but examination
of the system log identied a `PackageManager' entry show-
ing the fourth permission was a signature protection level
permission.
3. PERMISSION EVOLUTION
It is worth noting at this point that whilst we identied
four permissions which were attributed the `Unknown per-
mission' warning on API15, the Android documentation ac-
tually identies six permissions as having been \Added in
API Level 16" [3]. It was these unknown permissions and
this discrepancy with the documentation which highlighted
the need for more understanding of the evolution of the per-
mission architecture. This discrepancy will be discussed fur-
ther in Section 3.3.
In order to catalogue the permissions and their attributes
on various Android platform versions we employed six in-
stances of the Android emulator, one for each of the API
versions highlighted in Table 1 (APIs 8, 10, 13, 14, 15 and
16).
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e)
Figure 2: Permission Test app information on API15
Group
dangerous normal Total
Permissions Permissions Permissions
Your personal information 13 2 15
Development tools 4 0 4
Services that cost you money 2 0 2
Your location 3 1 4
Your messages 5 0 5
Network communication 4 2 6
Your accounts 3 1 4
Storage 1 0 1
Hardware controls 3 2 5
Phone calls 2 0 2
System tools 19 11 30
Default 0 1 1
- 59 20 79
Table 2: API15 permission groupings
Having collected information about both those permis-
sions granted and not granted, we saw that each of the at-
tributes (protection level, permission label and functional
grouping) showed some degree of change as the Android
platform evolved. As well as the permissions' attributes,
some permissions' very existence underwent change, as had
been suggested by our initial investigation. Space restric-
tions prevent us form reporting all our ndings, which are
described in a technical report available on-line [24].
3.1 Protection Level Definitions
The analysis of the Android system logs on the emulator
running API16 showed a considerable change in the protec-
tion level assignments when compared with previous API
versions. On API versions prior to API16 there were four
protection levels, as previously indicated. These four protec-
tion levels were assigned four numerical values: 0 for normal,
1 for dangerous, 2 for signature and 3 for signatureOrSys-
tem. Whilst these four protection levels exist in API16, two
new ags were introduced and assigned hex values of 0x10
for the system ag and 0x20 for the development ag [7].
These ags allow for a far greater combination of values
than just the previous four, although in the analysis we only
saw two new combinations used. The rst had a hex value
of 0x12 indicating a protection level of 2 with the new sys-
tem ag set. This is interpreted as signature or system
and seemed to overlap with the already existing signature-
OrSystem protection level. The second had a hex value of
0x32 indicating a protection level of 2 with both the system
and development ags set. This protection level is inter-
preted as signature or system or development and had no
previous equivalent. The original protection levels, the new
ags and the two new combinations are shown in Table 3.
The assignments to the new 0x12 protection level on
API16 suggested that this is a direct replacement for the
existing signatureOrSystem protection level. Where previ-
ously there had been as many as 23 permissions classied
as signatureOrSystem, in API16 this dropped to zero and
21 permissions were classied under the new 0x12 protec-
tion level. Every one of these 21 permissions was previously
classied as signatureOrSystem in API15.
In API16 there were eight permissions classied under the
new 0x32 protection level. These eight permissions were pre-
viously classied under several of the other protection levels
| two were signatureOrSystem whilst six were dangerous.
Decimal Hex Binary Protection Level
Before API16
0 0x00 0000 0000 normal
1 0x01 0000 0001 dangerous
2 0x02 0000 0010 signature
3 0x03 0000 0011 signatureOrSystem
API16 Flags
- 0x10 0001 0000 system
- 0x20 0010 0000 development
API16 Combinations
18 0x12 0001 0010 signature or system
50 0x32 0011 0010 signature or system or development
Table 3: Protection Levels
3.2 Permission Re-classification
The re-classications associated with the new protec-
tion levels in API16 were just part of the permission
re-classications identied during the cataloging of per-
missions. Across the entire catalogue there were 36 re-
classications with 21 of these associated with changes from
signatureOrSystem to 0x12, as identied above, and there-
fore considered less signicant from a security point of view.
Every one of the 36 re-classications involved a move to a
new classication which was at least as restrictive as the
old classication. The 15 changes which were not associated
with the change from signatureOrSystem to 0x12, occur
across the evolution of 14 of the 130 permissions, as shown
in Table 4.
Of these 14 permissions, there are several worthy of men-
tion. The DISABLE_KEYGUARD permission enables an app to
`disable keylock' on the device. This permission started out
as a normal permission and was re-classied in API10 to
dangerous. It does seem strange that such a permission
was originally considered to be so innocuous, but hindsight
is often biased by experience. Another interesting permis-
sion is DUMP. This permission started out as dangerous due
to the fact, as its label describes, it allows an app to `retrieve
sensitive internal state'. In API10 it was re-classied to sig-
natureOrSystem and it was re-classied again in API16 to
0x50 (signature or systems or development). This latest
move does not further restrict use of the permission, but
does hint at making the capability more useful to develop-
ers, who likely would have been unable to make easy use of
it whilst it was classied as signatureOrSystem.
3.3 Permission Growth
Whilst certain permissions have been re-classied during
the evolution of the Android permission architecture, new
permissions have been added with most new versions of the
platform. As shown in Table 5 there have been as many
as seven new permissions added from one version to the
next. From our baseline version of API8 there were three
additions in API10, two additions by API13, seven addi-
tions in API14, no additions in API15 and four additions in
API16. In total 16 permissions were added between API8
and API16, approximately 12% of the 130 permissions doc-
umented in API16. Whilst the classication of permissions
to protection levels changed across the platform versions as
already discussed, most new permissions were assigned to
the signatureOrSystem (or its equivalent 0x12) and 0x32
protection levels.
As we saw at the start of Section 3, it was the four un-
known permissions we rst identied in API15, when com-
pared against the Android documentation's list of 130 per-
missions for API16 [5], which triggered this investigation.
The Android documentation, however, identies six per-
missions as being new to API16 [3] but only four of these
were not granted to us when using API15. In fact the
two supposedly new permissions which were granted to us,
READ_USER_DICTIONARY and WRITE_USER_DICTIONARY were
granted during installation of Permission Test on each of
the emulated platforms, going as far back as API8. A check
of the Android source code also showed that these permis-
sions existed in API8, as our results indicated. It is unclear
at this time why these are documented as new to API16
based on this evidence. It is clear from the results so far
discussed and from the Android source code that a large
number of permission related changes were performed be-
tween API15 and API16. This does seem to include changes
to the groupings which these two permissions are assigned
to, but they are just a small part of a much wider change and
seem to be the only two permissions which are incorrectly
highlighted as new.
Interestingly, there were two other discrepancies of this
nature. The Android documentation identies ve permis-
sions as being added in API14 and two in API15 [1, 2]. Our
experiments suggest that all seven permissions were added
in API14, with none added in API15.
3.4 Permission Re-labeling
As we have seen, in particular from the results shown
in Table 5, there were a large number of changes made in
API16. In addition to those already mentioned, a further
signicant change was that 47 permissions underwent a re-
labeling between API15 and API16. A few permissions had
previously been re-labeled, but as part of API16's now ob-
vious widespread permission changes, approximately 36% of
permissions were re-labeled. The re-labeling looks to have
been performed so as to make it clearer to users which capa-
bilities a permission enables an app to use. Some examples
of this include:
 ACCESS_COARSE_LOCATION | `coarse (network-based)
location' was changed to `approximate (network-
based) location'
 AUTHENTICATE_ACCOUNTS| `act as an account authen-
ticator' was changed to `create accounts and set pass-
words'
 SYSTEM_ALERT_WINDOW | `display system level alerts'
was changed to `draw over other apps'
3.5 Permission Group Change
Finally, we identied one change to the functional group
assignment of a permission during the analysis. The
Protection Level (decimal)
Permission API8 API10 API13 API14 API15 API16
CHANGE_COMPONENT_ENABLED_STATE 2 3 3 3 3 18
DISABLE_KEYGUARD 0 1 1 1 1 1
DUMP 1 3 3 3 3 50
MODIFY_PHONE_STATE 1 3 3 3 3 18
READ_FRAME_BUFFER 2 2 2 3 3 18
READ_LOGS 1 1 1 1 1 50
SET_ALWAYS_FINISH 1 1 1 1 1 50
SET_ANIMATION_SCALE 1 1 1 1 1 50
SET_DEBUG_APP 1 1 1 1 1 50
SET_PROCESS_LIMIT 1 1 1 1 1 50
SIGNAL_PERSISTENT_PROCESSES 1 1 1 1 1 50
UPDATE_DEVICE_STATS 2 3 3 3 3 18
WRITE_APN_SETTINGS 1 1 1 3 3 18
WRITE_SECURE_SETTINGS 3 3 3 3 3 50
Table 4: Protection Level changes across platform versions
Permission Count
Number of ... API8 API10 API13 API14 API15 API16
normal (0) permissions 20 20 20 20 20 21
dangerous (1) permissions 54 55 55 59 59 55
signature (2) permissions 24 22 23 24 24 25
signatureOrSystem (3) permissions 16 20 21 23 23 0
0x12 (18) permissions 0 0 0 0 0 21
0x32 (50) permissions 0 0 0 0 0 8
Unknown permissions 16 13 11 4 4 0
New permissions - 3 2 7 0 4
Re-labeled permission - 2 0 2 0 47
Table 5: Android permissions breakdown across platform versions
READ_LOGS permission was moved from the `System tools'
group in API8 to the `Your personal information' group in
API10.
3.6 New Versions of Android
Two new versions of the Android platform have been re-
leased since our original analysis: API17 was released at the
end of 2012 and API18 was released mid 2013. We briey
summarize some of the main changes.
The Android documentation lists 130 permissions [5] for
API16. However, our analysis of the Android source code
revealed the API16 release code contained 180 permissions
and 12 functional groups. As of API17, the Android doc-
umentation continues to list 130 permissions [5] and, when
compared to API16, no permission additions or changes are
indicated [4]. Our analysis of the API17 release code, how-
ever, suggests that there have been a variety of modica-
tions. These modications include the addition of 20 per-
missions, taking the total in the Android source code to 200
permissions and 31 functional groups. Of these 20 permis-
sions, two are duplicates of existing permissions and seem
to have been added to the source by mistake.
Of those permissions that already existed, ve permis-
sions moved to a more restrictive protection level although,
more signicantly from a security standpoint, eight permis-
sions moved from dangerous to normal. This reduction in
protection level was not seen across any of the previous plat-
form updates that we have investigated. These results can
be seen in Table 6.
Protection Level
(decimal)
Permission API16 API17
BATTERY_STATS 0 1
CHANGE_CONFIGURATION 1 50
CHANGE_NETWORK_STATE 1 0
MODIFY_AUDIO_SETTINGS 1 0
MOUNT_FORMAT_FILESYSTEMS 1 18
MOUNT_UNMOUNT_FILESYSTEMS 1 18
PERSISTENT_ACTIVITY 1 0
REORDER_TASKS 1 0
SERIAL_PORT 0 18
SET_TIME_ZONE 1 0
WAKE_LOCK 1 0
WRITE_SETTINGS 1 0
WRITE_SYNC_SETTINGS 1 0
Table 6: Protection Level changes in API17
As well as these changes to the permissions themselves,
API17 modies the app info screen and how permissions are
displayed to users (compare Figure 3 to Figure 2). Permis-
sions of dierent protection levels are no longer separated,
with the normal permissions included alongside the danger-
ous ones and all permanently visible. Whilst the changes to
(a) (b)
Figure 3: Permission Test app information on API17
the app info screen may make the display more consistent,
the user can no longer distinguish, and therefore no longer
draw benet from the classication of, normal and danger-
ous permissions. In fact, the changes to the app info screen
may obscure changes in dangerous permissions as there are
now more permissions to examine, compared to the default
display in API16.
The release of API18 included an update to the number
of documented permissions, from 130 to 134 [5]. A prelim-
inary analysis of the source code indicates that in fact 9
new permissions have been added whilst three have been re-
moved. Of those three, two of them are the duplicates added
in API17.
As with API17, API18 also makes a permission architec-
ture related modication apart from the permission addi-
tions and deletions just mentioned. In the case of API18,
a new, yet currently hidden, interface has been identied
which seems to identify the permissions an app is coded to
make use of, rather than just relying on which permissions it
requests in its AndroidManfiest.xml. This `App ops' screen
suggests that in some future version of Android the user will
be able to selectively grant or deny permissions.
4. THIRD-PARTY PERMISSIONS
Having catalogued changes to the Android permission ar-
chitecture across a number of platform versions, it was ob-
vious that the Platform Manager was processing permission
requests by comparing the manifest permissions requested
by an app against some reference list within the platform.
This reference list was obviously changing over time and it
was the existence of a permission on this list, along with the
protection level assigned to it, which determined whether
a permission would be unknown, granted or denied when
requested by an app at installation time.
4.1 Investigation
One nal aspect of the permission architecture was left to
investigate, that of third-party dened permissions. Recall
that requesting a built-in permission that was not available
on a given platform would result in an `Unknown permission'
log entry (see Section 2.2). It seemed likely that requesting
a third-party permission which was not yet dened would
result in a similar log entry. In order to test this hypothesis
we created two new test apps, Permission Test Creator and
Permission Test Requestor.
Permission Test Creator denes a third-party per-
mission com.escapadesinsecurity.android.permis-
sion.value.TEST and categorises it under the dangerous
protection level. It also requests this permission and
the built-in INTERNET permission, used here as a control.
Permission Test Requestor on the other hand did not dene
any third-party permissions, but did request the same two
permissions, com.escapadesinsecurity.android.permis-
sion.value.TEST and INTERNET.
In order to determine if our expectations were correct,
we installed the two test apps one after the other on the
Galaxy Nexus device. The rst time we installed Permission
Test Creator before Permission Test Requestor, reviewing
the granted permissions as we went. Here we were requesting
only permissions that had been dened. We then uninstalled
both apps from the device. The second time we installed
Permission Test Requestor before Permission Test Creator,
once again reviewing the granted permissions as we went.
Here we were requesting a third-party permission before it
was dened.
4.2 Findings
4.2.1 Creator then Requestor
Having rst installed Permission Test Cre-
ator, its app info screen was reviewed and both
the com.escapadesinsecurity.android.permis-
sion.value.TEST and INTERNET permissions were listed as
granted. Permission Test Requestor was then installed and
its app info screen was reviewed. This also showed both
permissions as granted.
This series of events aligns with the operation of built-in
permissions. When the permission being requested exists, in
this case because the dening app is already installed, then
the permission is granted.
4.2.2 Requestor then Creator
Having uninstalled both apps, we rst installed
Permission Test Requestor. Its app info screen
was then reviewed and only the INTERNET permis-
sion was listed as granted. Permission Test Creator
was then installed and its app info screen reviewed.
Both the com.escapadesinsecurity.android.permis-
sion.value.TEST and INTERNET permissions were listed as
granted. This is what we expected: when the requesting
app was installed prior to the permission being dened,
it was unable to be granted; whereas Permission Test
Creator was obviously able to request the permission it
itself dened, just as it had been during the rst test.
A subsequent review of the Permission Test Re-
questor app info screen, however, revealed that
the com.escapadesinsecurity.android.permis-
sion.value.TEST permission had been added to the
previously listed INTERNET permission. This suggested that
the permissions were being re-evaluated in some way, even
though the requesting app was not modied after initial
installation.
It was this observation combined with the knowledge
gained from the evolution investigation which highlighted
an obvious question | If third-party permissions, which are
unknown prior to the dening app being installed, are in
some way re-evaluated post denition, does the same thing
happen with unknown built-in permissions?
4.3 Further Analysis
Before we move on to discuss the exploit hypothesis which
naturally ows from the question just raised, we discuss a
number of other ndings applicable to third-party permis-
sions revealed by our investigation.
4.3.1 App Info Screen
During the investigation just described, the two test apps
were written in the same vein as the original Permission
Test. Neither actually made use of the third-party dened
permission, they simply requested it in their manifest as the
130 built-in permissions had been before. During further
analysis, new versions of these two apps were created with
the third-party permission employed to control Intent access
to the Permission Test Creator app. Permission Test Re-
questor was coded to make use of an Intent, and through it
to pass a text string for display by Permission Test Creator.
If the third-party dened permission was not requested by,
or granted to, Permission Test Requestor then it would be
unable to trigger Permission Test Creator.
We ran the two experiments as described in Sec-
tion 4.2, but this time, as well as reviewing the app
info screens, the Intent function was triggered within Per-
mission Test Requestor as a test of the ability to use
the permission. Unexpectedly, we found a discrepancy
in the second experiment (where Permission Test Cre-
ator is installed after Permission Test Requestor). Even
though the com.escapadesinsecurity.android.permis-
sion.value.TEST permission was listed on the Permission
Test Requestor app info screen once Permission Test Cre-
ator was installed, an `Access Denial' exception was thrown
when the Intent was triggered.
A review of the data/system/packages.xml system le
conrmed that the permission had not been granted. It
would seem that whilst the app info screen had been up-
dated, once the permission had been dened, the actual
permission requested had not been granted to the app. Con-
sidering this screen is a user's sole indicator of an installed
app's permissions, such inaccuracies further reduce a user's
abilities to make security and privacy decisions about the
apps that they install.
4.3.2 Change in Protection Level
Having identied that a permission categorised as dan-
gerous is not actually granted when dened after the in-
stallation of a requesting app, we modied Permission Test
Creator so the protection level of the permission was sig-
nature. In this case the permission was granted and the
Intent was successful (even though the dening app was in-
stalled after the requesting app). The dierence this time
was that the permission was not listed on the app info screen
(although this was to be expected as it was now categorised
as signature).
These observations further highlight the complexity of the
Android permission architecture and some of the inconsis-
tencies in its implementation on the Android platform.
5. DORMANT REQUESTS
To summarize: we have discovered that if (i) we install
an app whose manifest includes a third-party permission
that is unknown to the platform and (ii) that permission
is subsequently dened by a newly installed app, then that
\dormant" permission will become available to the rst app.
This raises the following important question: Does the same
thing happen with unknown built-in permissions?
5.1 Hypothesis
We used this question as the basis for the following hy-
pothesis: Could a malicious app be created that includes
built-in permissions which are not dened in the version of
the platform on which the app is initially installed, but which
\awaken"at a later time, without the user's knowledge, when
the device's platform is upgraded?
Three requirements would have to be met for such a mali-
cious app to be possible. Firstly, a developer would need to
be able to identify permissions which are to be introduced
in future versions of the Android platform, and then build
an app which did not crash or otherwise indicate to a user
its intent whilst running on the older platform. This re-
quirement is met, since the Android platform, has changed
over time and, no doubt, will continue to do so. Google al-
ready announce and document changes in the platform so
that developers can write software making use of the latest
features [6]. This documentation is often in place well before
the majority of users have even heard of the new platform
version, let alone have hold of a device which has it installed.
It is also trivial for a developer to have their app identify
the version of the platform it is running on, using a call to
Build.VERSION.SDK_INT for example, and then modify the
actions taken based on the result.
Secondly, new permissions would need to be introduced
and be congured to protect sensitive capabilities within
the Android platform. Without this, whilst a developer
could technically write an app to request unknown permis-
sions, they wouldn't have any permissions to request that
they could take malicious benet from. This requirement is
known to already have been met. We have already identi-
ed the existence of such unknown permissions and in fact
of those introduced in API16, two of these, READ_CALL_LOG
and WRITE_CALL_LOG, are marked with a protection level
of dangerous and likely to be considered by many as pro-
tecting sensitive information. API16 also introduced the
READ_EXTERNAL_STORAGE permission which sounds perfect
for malicious activity. It was, however, introduced with-
out mandatory enforcement within the platform. Instead it
was introduced as a precursor to future platform restriction
and was initially only present to aid adoption by developers.
Thirdly, the question posed at the start of this section
must have a positive answer. There must be some re-
evaluation present for built-in permissions in the same way
that we had witnessed for third-party permissions. In or-
der to determine if this nal requirement was also met, one
further investigation was required.
5.2 Malicious App
In order to test our hypothesis we wrote a new test app,
Permission Test Jelly Bean. This app was coded to request
three permissions within its manifest | READ_CALL_LOG,
WRITE_CALL_LOG and READ_EXTERNAL_STORAGE. These were
three permissions already identied as being new to API16.
The test app rst identies the platform version on which
it has been installed. If it nds it isn't on API16 then it
performs no action, other than writing the following message
to the system log: `ABC123: I'm not on Jelly Bean, I'm on
SDK??, so I must be good - shhh, don't draw attention to
yourself!' (where SDK?? is replaced with the actual SDK
version the app is running on). If the app instead identies
it is running on API16 then it performs a series of operations:
1. The app writes the message `ABC123: I'm on Jelly
Bean, so I can be bad - shhh, don't draw attention to
yourself!' to the system log.
2. The app uses the READ_CALL_LOG permission to access
the user's call log.
3. The app writes the phone numbers found in the call
log to the system log.
4. The app uses the WRITE_CALL_LOG permission to write
a new entry to the user's call log.
5. The app documents this new entry in the system log.
6. The app veries whether external storage is present in
the device.
7. The app uses the READ_EXTERNAL_STORAGE permission
to read the folder and les in the root of the external
storage (if present).
8. The app writes the names of any folders or les found
into the system log.
No matter whether running on API16 or not, the test app
always displays the same `Hello World' message to the user
via the device screen. In this way the app has a visually
consistent behaviour on all platform versions.
It should be clear that Permission Test Jelly Bean ts
the requirements for a malicious app attempting to make
use of unknown permissions. The app makes use of the
permissions only on API16, and uses them whilst providing
no visual indication to the user (other than that entailed in
demonstrating use of the permissions in question, such as
writing a false call log entry).
5.3 Exploit
The app was installed on a Galaxy Nexus device running
API15. During the installation there was no prompt for
permissions to be authorized by the user. A review of the
app info screen showed no dangerous or normal permissions
as having been granted.
The test app was run, and, as coded, the only visual in-
dication was the `Hello World' message displayed on the
screen. When the system log was reviewed a single log entry
was present as shown in Figure 4a.
A system update was then applied, using the standard
Android process, and the platform updated to API16. The
update process ends with the device booting into the newly
installed API16 version of the Android platform. Once the
device restarted, the test app was re-run and once again the
`Hello World' message was displayed. This time however,
when the system log was reviewed it was clear that malicious
action had been taken by the app. Multiple log entries were
present, as shown in Figure 4b. It had read four entries from
the call log and wrote an additional random entry back to
it. The app also found 11 directories (d) within the root of
the external storage and four les (f).
At no time after the test app's installation were we
prompted to authorize the permissions it requested; not even
when the system update was performed, those permissions
were dened and the device restarted. At the time Permis-
sion Test Jelly Bean was run on API16 there had been no
visual cue to the user that the permissions had changed.
A review of the app info screen did now show the permis-
sions as granted however. This change had, just like the re-
evaluation of third-party permissions, completed automati-
cally in the background when the permissions were dened
and without providing any notication to the user.1
5.4 Repercussions
Our successful test had shown that it is indeed possible
to request built-in permissions prior to their introduction in
a newer version of the Android platform. We also showed
that an app that requested these permissions could disguise
this fact and then maliciously utilise these permissions once
a device was upgraded to the platform version which de-
ned them. Whilst the test app we developed only performs
local logging actions, it is not dicult to envisage a more
protable scenario for a malicious developer.
For example, a malicious app could be constructed as
a weather app, and could legitimately request the INTER-
NET and ACCESS_COARSE_LOCATION permissions in order to
retrieve weather information for the user's location (two
permissions commonly requested by weather apps and wid-
gets [18]). These two permissions would allow the app access
to network connectivity and approximate location informa-
tion and could be used by the app, whilst running benignly,
to provide weather information. During the installation it
is unlikely that many users would reject such permission re-
quests. Should the user update their device platform, which
for many would simply entail clicking an install button when
they are prompted that an over-the-air system update is
available, then the malicious app's dormant permission re-
quests would become active. The app could then use those
permissions to access sensitive information, assuming appli-
cable new permissions, and could then misuse the two legit-
imate permissions to send that information along with the
user's location over the Internet to the app's developer.
It would only be through reviewing the app's app info
screen after the update, and thus viewing the currently
granted permissions, that the user would have any chance of
becoming aware of the new capabilities available to the app.
Whilst this review would enable the user to determine the
discrepancy and uninstall the app, the likelihood that users
regularly perform those checks at this time is, we believe, ex-
tremely low. We also believe that many users would fail to
identify the new permissions as such and would most likely
assume they had been present all the time, therefore being
less likely to take any corrective action. Whilst research has
been performed into user understanding and awareness of
permissions [19, 23], at this time we are not aware of any
research being performed into user's recollection of what per-
missions an app has (without reviewing) nor what an app
should have (from a blank slate). These are appropriate ar-
1The exploit works perfectly well with APIs 17 and 18
(although the dormant permissions in API(x) relative to
API(x+ 1) dier for each x).
(a) System log entry on API15
(b) System log entries on API16
Figure 4: Permission Test Jelly Bean log entries
eas for future research considering the weakness identied
here.
Hopefully our test app has shown that to achieve such
a scenario would not be dicult. We required no com-
plex development or reverse engineering expertise in order to
achieve our goals. We simply wrote a standard Android app
which requested some permissions and made use of them on
a specic version of the Android platform. This is exactly
what many Android developers likely do with every app they
write.
5.5 Potential Mitigation
The ultimate cause of the weakness we identied is the
re-evaluation of permissions at the time of system update.
It could be argued however, that in reality the actual secu-
rity threat associated with the weakness stems from this
re-evaluation being performed automatically in the back-
ground, with no indication of any change being presented
to the user. In this way, the user is unable to make the
security decisions about an app which they are otherwise
required to make.
It would be easy to suggest that permissions should not
be automatically re-evaluated and granted without user in-
teraction. This would certainly align with the original de-
nition of the dangerous protection level, which is, as stated
by Google [7]:
\A higher-risk permission that would give a re-
questing application access to private user data
or control over the device that can negatively im-
pact the user. Because this type of permission
introduces potential risk, the system may not
automatically grant it to the requesting appli-
cation. For example, any dangerous permissions
requested by an application may be displayed to
the user and require conrmation before proceed-
ing, or some other approach may be taken to
avoid the user automatically allowing the use of
such facilities."
There are, however, reasons why such a suggestion may be
short-sighted. Much research has been performed in the area
of permission authorization and user interaction for security
decisions [19, 23, 21, 22, 17, 13]. The general consensus
is that users are not particularly good at making security-
related decisions, although the reasons for this vary. In some
cases there is seen to be a distinct lack of user knowledge
which could be considered a pre-requisite for such decisions.
In others, the users do not perceive the risk as signicant
enough to decide against installing the app. In some other
cases, the users simply do not see the responsibility to be
theirs. There is also anecdotal evidence from users them-
selves regarding their willingness to participate in such de-
cisions, with 58% of 5,950 Android Central forum users ad-
mitting \I just click right through" [15].
Adding another permission authorization decision may
not therefore be the answer. If users do \just click right
through" then this is likely just another dialogue they will
ignore. An alternative to asking the user to explicitly au-
thorize the changes identied by re-evaluation would be to
simply indicate to the user that a change has occurred and
provide the means to review and revoke these permissions
should they desire. For example, the Android notication
system [9] could be employed, where the notication also
includes actions made available to review the permissions
of the app or to uninstall the app. Whilst this would not
meet Google's denition of the dangerous protection level,
it would at least provide awareness and give users the abil-
ity to make an informed decision. At this time, even this is
lacking and so the user is left unduly exposed.
These two potential mitigations are no doubt not the only
options and, based on the breadth of research in this area,
it is clear that the problem of user-device interaction in the
context of security decisions is one that is both complex and
as yet unresolved. We believe one thing is however clear, the
current automatic and invisible re-evaluation of permissions
leaves users unable to make the very decisions the Android
platform demands of them. This aw in the implementation
of the permission architecture requires resolution.
6. RELATEDWORK
Our work considers the way in which Android permissions
have evolved over time, how permissions are referenced by
apps at installation time, and how the interaction of these
two aspects of Android permission management combine to
create the threat of dormant permissions. We have also
examined ways in which the threat posed by dormant per-
missions might be reduced, concluding that the attitude of
users to authorizing permissions is central to the ecacy of
any mitigations. We are unaware of any work in the litera-
ture that covers similar ground. However, we briey discuss
the most closely related concepts and research below.
One might think of the problem of dormant permissions
as a new type of time-of-check-to-time-of-use (TOCTTOU)
problem. Such a problem \occurs when a program checks
for a particular characteristic of an object, and then takes
some action that assumes the characteristic still holds when
in fact it does not" [14]. TOCTTOU aws can, for example,
lead to access to sensitive les or to continued access to pro-
tected resources even after authorization has been revoked.
Dormant permissions mean that capabilities not available
to an app become available at some point in the future, be-
cause permission authorization is only checked when the app
is installed, not when the set of permissions changes (due to
the installation of a third-party app or a platform upgrade).
Au et al. examined the permission architectures of vari-
ous smartphone platforms in general, and Android in par-
ticular [10]. They highlighted the problem of apps having
more privileges than required and also tracked the number of
permissions added in early versions of Android (up to 2.3).
Porter Felt et al. modied the permission verication mech-
anism of Android 2.2 in order to identify which API calls
result in permission checks. They then built `Stowaway', a
tool for static analysis of apps, and used it to determine per-
mission errors (particularly overprivilege) within the apps
tested [20]. Vidas et al. also analysed apps to identify per-
mission errors, highlighting duplicate permissions and over-
privilege in particular [26]. Barrera et al. developed a frame-
work for evaluating permission-based security models and
used their methodology to analyze the Android permission
architecture [12], which led to suggestions for improving the
structure of the Android permission architecture. While all
the work described above is concerned with Android permis-
sions, none of this prior research considers the way in which
the evolution of the permission architecture might aect the
permissions that are installed by apps.
Chia et al. considered the permissions used by apps for
a number of platforms, including Android [16]. They fo-
cused on comparing the permissions requested by popular
and newly added apps as well as considering the eective-
ness of risk signals available to users. Shin et al. identify
a means of abusing third-party permission requests through
the fact that permission strings can be easily copied and are
the only identifying requirement for uniqueness [25]. This
work considers some of the risks posed by permissions used
by third-party apps, but does not link this with the issue of
dormant permissions and permission evolution.
There have been several user studies designed to evaluate
various aspects of users' understanding of Android permis-
sions and the implications of making particular choices with
regard to permissions [17, 19, 22, 23]. Porter Felt et al.
have also investigated a number of alternative mechanisms
by which users can interact with permissions and suggested
that dierent permissions required dierent methods of in-
teraction [21]. This work will certainly be useful in deter-
mining the best way of mitigating the risk posed by dormant
permissions, something we hope to consider in future work.
7. CONCLUSION
We have undertaken an analysis of the Android permis-
sion architecture and its history. In doing so we have found
that numerous changes have occurred in the core attributes
associated with permissions | protection levels, functional
groups, and labels. It would seem that the changes so far
implemented have all been made with a view to increasing
the security of the platform, either through the restriction
of a permission or through an attempt to improve the user's
understanding of what a permission allows. We have not
performed any analysis as to how successful such changes
have been and we believe an interesting piece of further re-
search would be to determine whether users' comprehension
of permissions has been increased through the changes so far
made.
Through our analysis we have identied the outcome of
requesting various types of permissions, built-in permissions,
unknown permissions, third-party dened permissions and
undened third-party permissions. The platform response
to these allowed us to predict the presence of a weakness
in the permission architecture which we have proven to be
present. We have developed a simple test app which exploits
this weakness and have detailed a scenario under which a
developer could produce an app to exploit the weakness for
malicious gain.
We concluded by describing two potential mitigations to
the weakness and have highlighted some primary discussion
points regarding which mitigation is preferable. In future
work, we hope to develop user studies to determine which
mitigations are likely to be most eective.
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